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Abstract: Most discussions on the quality of government data overlook the legal 
framework within which data are collected. This paper examines India’s Census 
Act, 1948, which provides the legal-administrative framework for conducting 
human population census. The Act stipulates punishment for interfering with the 
process of enumeration, but the punitive provisions are rarely used and have not 
been invoked to deal with cases of mass manipulation of the census. Major instances 
of manipulation were, in fact, reported in 1951 and 2001 after the government 
introduced additional punitive measures in 1948 and 1994, respectively. This paper 
compares the Census Act, 1948 with other Indian laws related to the collection of 
statistics as well as census laws of other common law countries and identifies the 
structural flaws of the Indian law vis-à-vis manipulation. It uses simple games to 
explain why the punitive provisions of the Census Act, 1948 are redundant in the 
event of mass manipulation and suggests that the problem can be addressed without 
recourse to law. The insights drawn from the games are examined in light of the 
experience of Nagaland, a state of India where census statistics were manipulated 
on a large scale in 2001.
Keywords: Census, conflict, data quality, India, law, manipulation, multiple 
equilibria, Nagaland
* The author is grateful to the anonymous referees and Ankush Agrawal for insightful 
comments on the paper and to government officials in Kohima and New Delhi for 
helpful discussions. The usual disclaimers apply.

Manipulation of Census Data 
and the Limits of Punitive Legislation
Vikas Kumar
Introduction
Conflicts over the delimitation of administrative units and electoral constituencies and, by 
implication, population censuses can be seen as rites of passage in the lives of modern states outside 
the West.1 India’s last colonial census (GoI 1953: 1)2 and Nigeria’s first postcolonial census (Aluko 
1965) were marred by competitive manipulation. The journey of South Sudan, the latest member of 
the United Nations, towards independence was likewise marked by controversies over census and 
delimitation (Santschi 2008).
The importance of the census in newly independent countries can also be gauged from the fact that 
census law is often passed by interim governments even before the adoption of the constitution. 
Independent India enacted the Census Act, 1948 two years before the country’s constitution came 
into effect.3 This Act was passed after the 1941 Census, the last colonial census, which was affected 
by large-scale manipulation in the provinces of Punjab and Bengal driven by competition between 
communities (Maheshwari 1996; Ahmed 1999: 124),4 but it did not address the possibility of collusive 
manipulation. Not surprisingly, the law has been found to be ineffective against the recurrence 
of such problems in various parts of India, particularly with regard to census questions related to 
identity.5 The Census Act, 1948 has undergone several revisions over the years—in 1950, 1956, 1959, 
1963, 1965, 1974, 1976, 1986, and 1994—but the shortcomings with regard to collusive manipulation 
remain unaddressed. In fact, the 1994 amendment that added teeth to the punitive measures was 
followed by widespread manipulation of the 2001 Census of Nagaland, which is arguably the most 
significant instance of manipulation of the census in postcolonial India. Since then the 
government has not shown any intention of reworking the punitive provisions of the Census 
Act, 1948.
1 The United States, where decennial delimitation began in the late eighteenth century, was an early exemplar of the close 
relationship between modern states and centralised data collection as epitomised by the census.
2 Census statistics were widely used in political debates in colonial India (Kumar 2015).
3 Neighbouring Bangladesh too promulgated its census order before its constitution came into effect.
4 Coverage errors (error in overall headcount) of the 1941 Census were corrected in 1951 (Natarajan 1972: vii; GoI 1954: 5), but 
content errors (error in the sub-classification of headcount) persisted until much later (Gill 2007: 244).
5 For instances of manipulation of data on tribes, see Kulkarni (1991), Guha (2003), Agrawal and Kumar (2012 , 2013, 2018), and 
Verma (2013). For language, see Brass (1974) and Gill (2007). Only Kulkarni cursorily refers to the punitive provisions of the law.
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In light of the above, this paper explores an understudied interface between law and statistics. Most 
discussions on the quality of census data focus on problems related to the design and execution 
of surveys and bureaucratic and/or political interference. The legal framework that governs data 
collection exercises such as census is largely ignored in the literature. Explorations of the legal side 
are mostly restricted to ex post controversies associated with the census.6 This paper examines 
India’s Census Act, 1948 and argues that it is structurally incapable of handling instances of mass 
manipulation. Simple normal-form games with multiple equilibria are used to suggest that the 
punitive measures listed under the Act might be redundant in checking the mass manipulation of 
the census. It is further argued that societies can shift between equilibria even without the threat 
of (legal) punishment. The insights drawn from the games are examined in light of the experience 
of Nagaland.
The rest of the discussion in the paper is organised as follows. We will first discuss the flaws of 
the Census Act, 1948 and compare it with other Indian laws related to the collection of statistics 
(Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 and Collection of Statistics Act, 2008) as well as census 
laws in other common law countries such as Australia (Census and Statistics Act, 1905), Bangladesh 
(Census Order, 1972), Pakistan (General Statistics [Reorganization] Act, 2011), the United Kingdom 
(Census Act, 1920), and the United States (U.S. Code Title 13).7 We will then briefly discuss the 
manipulation of the census in Nagaland before using normal-form games to examine choices 
related to the manipulation and correction of headcounts available to competing communities.
A flawed law
In colonial India, a temporary Census Act was introduced before every decennial census that lapsed 
after the completion of the exercise. Proposals to provide a permanent legal basis for conducting 
population census were rejected by the colonial administration for one or other reason (Maheshwari 
1996: 137–139). Newly independent India introduced a permanent law, the Census Act, 1948, to 
provide a proper legal framework for conducting population censuses.8
6 Other interfaces between law and statistics include litigation over published statistics, the use of statistical evidence in 
litigation, and the use of statistics in legal research. Litigation over census statistics and delimitation is commonplace 
in democracies and India is not an exception, but to the best of this author’s knowledge this litigation has not been 
systematically analysed in case of India. In recent decades, the United States, Census has attracted a lot of litigation related 
to the correction of population estimates used to delimit electoral seats and redistribute federal resources (Sann 1981; 
Bradshaw 1996; Goldin 2000; Prewitt 2003, 2010; Hamsher 2005).
7 While the scope of the paper is limited to India, some of its immediate neighbours, and major common law countries in the 
West, a broader set of common law countries including those in South and East Africa and East Asia are covered in Figure 2.
8 India’s Constituent Assembly assigned the “Census” to the Union List (Constitution of India, Schedule VII, Item No. 69; also 
Census Act, 1948, Section 3), making the union government responsible for conducting censuses. The English version of 
the Constitution mentions “Census,” while the Hindi version mentions janagaṇanā (literally, counting people) (GoI 2011b: 
12–13). The latter is more restrictive in scope, as it implies that the Parliament’s “exclusive power to make laws” (Art 246) is 
restricted to human population census. Census is also referred to in the following articles of the Constitution: 55 (Manner of 
Election of the President), 81 (Composition of the House of the People), and 170 (Composition of the Legislative Assemblies). 
Later amendments added references to the census in Arts 82 (Readjustment after each census), 243 (The Panchayats), 243P 
(Municipal bodies), 330 (Reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the House of the People), and 332 
(Reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Legislative Assemblies of the States).
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In his introduction to the new census law independent India’s first home minister noted the 
difficulties faced in the 1941 Census due to communal conflict (Maheshwari 1996: 139-140). The 
Census Act, 1948 broadly followed the template of the colonial law, but it enhanced punishments 
“to check the interplay of sectional, religious or communal rivalries” ( Maheshwari 1996: 141). 
The revised punitive provisions, however, failed to check the manipulation of census. In the very 
first census after independence, competition between communities in Punjab, the Patiala and East 
Punjab States Union (PEPSU) and Himachal Pradesh affected the data on language and the relevant 
tables were not published to avoid exacerbating linguistic and religious conflicts (Gill 2007: 244).
The provisions of the Census Act, 1948 can be classified according to whether they apply to public 
servants, as defined in Section 5 of the Act, or to others. In the case of public servants, offences are 
linked to non-fulfilment of duties, as specified in Section 6. Likewise, the duties of local bodies are 
specified in Section 4A. Others can violate the law in at least five ways. They may fail to fulfil the 
duties assigned to them (Section 7), fail to provide material support for conducting census (Section 
7), fail to respond to questions or may supply incorrect information (Sections 8 and 10), refuse to 
provide access to premises (Section 9), and trespass into a census office (Section 11h). The first 
two situations can arise because the Act empowers public servants to seek the support of others 
to conduct census. The government is required to compensate the owners of private premises or 
vehicles. While the latter can challenge the quantum of compensation and call for arbitration, they 
cannot deny their personal or material support, if asked for. Penalties for offences are specified in 
Section 11. The rest of the Census Act, 1948 provides the legal and administrative framework within 
which the punitive provisions can be invoked. The Act is supplemented by the Census Rules, 1990 
(amended in 1994) that fill in details related to administrative aspects.
While “any person who intentionally gives a false answer or refuses to answer” as well as “any 
census-officer who . . . knowingly makes a false return” are both liable to be punished, we will 
restrict our focus to non-public servants who supply incorrect information qua respondents.
Sections 8 and 11 are the core of the Census Act from the perspective of manipulation. Section 8 
of the Census Act, 1948 makes it legally binding to answer the questions asked by census officers.
Section 8. (Asking of questions and obligation to answer) (1) A census-officer may ask all 
such questions of all persons within the limits of the local area for which he is appointed 
as, by instructions issued in this behalf by the [Central Government] and published in 
the Official Gazette, he may be directed to ask. (2) Every person of whom any question 
is asked under sub-section (1) shall be legally bound to answer such question to the best 
of his knowledge or belief: Provided that no person shall be bound to state the name of 
any female member of his household, and no woman shall be bound to state the name of 
her husband or deceased husband or of any other person whose name she is forbidden 
by custom to mention. (Also, see Section 10. Occupier or manager to fill up schedule)
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The Indian (supra), Bangladeshi (Census Order, 1972, Art 7), and Pakistani (General Statistics 
[Reorganization] Act, 2011, Art 23[4]) census laws make the answering of all but one question 
compulsory. They provide exemption only in case custom forbids the respondent from mentioning 
the names of certain relatives. In contrast, the British (Census Act, 1920, amended 1991 and 2000, Art 
8[1A]),9 the American (U.S. Code Title 13, Section 221[c]), and the Australian (Census and Statistics 
Act, 1905, Section 14[3]) censuses provide exemption in the case of religion. This distinction 
between the census law of common law countries in the West and that of the countries of the Indian 
subcontinent has its roots in the enumerative practices of the colonial state. Bhagat (2003) points 
out that macro-level ascriptive identity markers such as religion, caste, and tribe were used to 
categorise people in colonies even though state and religion were kept apart in the United Kingdom 
and in other white-settler colonies.
The refusal to answer questions and the giving of false responses are punishable offences under 
Section 11 of the Census Act, 1948.
Section 11. (Penalties) (1d) any person who intentionally gives a false answer to, or 
refuses to answer to the best of his knowledge or belief, any question asked of him 
by a census-officer which he is legally bound by section 8 to answer, or . . . (1g) any 
person who, having been required under section 10 to fill up a schedule, knowingly and 
without sufficient cause fails to comply with the provisions of that section, or makes 
any false return thereunder, or . . . (2) Whoever abets any offence under sub-section (1) 
shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees.
We will argue that the punitive provisions of the Census Act, 1948 suffer from several structural 
flaws in regard to the treatment of strategic interactions during the process of enumeration, the 
handling of erroneous data, and the application of the law.
Flat fines
The Census Act, 1948 treats refusing to respond and giving incorrect response as comparable offenses 
and, therefore, prescribes identical fines. This is also true of Bangladesh, Pakistan and United 
Kingdom, where there is just one category of punishment for respondents who violate census 
laws. In the United States fines differ depending on whether one “refuses or willfully neglects . . . 
to answer” (not more than $ 100) (U.S. Code Title 13, Section 221[a]) or “willfully gives any answer 
that is false” (not more than $ 500) (U.S. Code Title 13, Section 221[b]). Likewise, in Australia, 
nonresponse attracts a fine of one penalty unit (Census and Statistics Act 1905, Section 14[1], i.e., 
A$ 210), whereas false response attracts a fine of 10 penalty units (Census and Statistics Act, 1905, 
Section 15, i.e., A$ 2100).
9 This clause was introduced in 2000 before the 2001 Census in which a question on religion was asked for the first time in the 
United Kingdom.
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Moreover, the census law of India does not link punishment to the seriousness of offence. The 
punishment for refusing to answer one question is same as that for refusing to answer multiple 
questions. Furthermore, the fine for refusing to respond to a question related to the ownership of 
bicycle is same as that for refusal to answer crucial questions on migration, fertility, and age.
Collusive manipulation
Figure 1 depicts the range of possibilities of manipulation: an individual could deliberately give 
an incorrect response to a question, an individual could deliberately give incorrect responses to 
multiple questions, there could be collusion between individuals to give incorrect responses to one 
or more questions, and an individual could deliberately give incorrect responses to one or more 
questions in connivance with an enumerator. Only the first of these possibilities is directly covered 
in Section 11. The Act does not see collusive manipulation and manipulation by an individual as 
structurally different. Section 11(2) mechanically addresses the possibility of collusion by making 
abetment punishable, but it does not recognise the distinctive (potentially political) character of 
collusive manipulation. The instruction manual for census officials shows a better understanding 
of the possibilities of collusive manipulation. It gives the following instructions to enumerators in 
this regard.
If you have reasons to suspect that in any area due to any organised movement, 6.52. 
the religion is; 6.60. the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes are; 6.71.i. the mother 
tongue is not being truthfully returned, you should record them as actually returned 
by the respondent and make a report to your Supervisory Officer for verification (GoI 
nd2: 45–47, emphasis added).
While the possibilities of collusive manipulation by respondents leading to content errors 
(misreporting of identity) and omission and duplication by enumerators resulting in coverage 
errors (GoI nd2: 29) are acknowledged in the manual, collusive manipulation by respondents 
leading to coverage errors are not discussed.
Further, the Act does not say anything explicitly about collusive manipulation by an enumerator 
and a respondent. Section 11(2) makes punishable the abetment by a person (the Act does not 
clarify, but could include officials) of the non-fulfillment of responsibilities by a non-governmental 
person, which include the refusal to respond, giving incorrect responses, and obstructing or 
interfering with census in various ways. Also note that the possibility of manipulation of data by 
the government (see, for instance, Gill 2007) is not covered by the punitive provisions of the Act. 
The government can manipulate the categories of enumeration and/or even the collected data.10
10 Other laws that govern statistics too overlook the possibility of government manipulating statistics. Some laws note that the 
government could make mistakes, but explicitly state that the punitive provisions do not apply to it. For example, India’s draft 
Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016 explicitly exempted government bodies from its punitive provisions (Art 37).
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Figure 1: Possibilities of manipulation and the Census Act, 1948
Possibilities of manipulation not explicitly covered by the Census Act, 1948
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The Indian census seems to have a limited legroom to counter collusive manipulation. The design 
of the Indian census tries to minimise the possibilities of manipulation and double counting by 
simultaneously counting the population in a territory through the extended de facto (synchronous) 
method of enumeration. However, this provision engenders distrust in an ethnically fractured 
society where the impartiality of the government is suspect. Communities try to secure their future 
entitlements or protect their existing entitlements by making sure that they have numbers on their 
side (Agrawal and Kumar 2018). They resort to manipulation as they fear that the government will 
be unable, or unwilling, to stop other communities from manipulating statistics.
A hollow threat
The fines are very small in magnitude. The magnitude of the fine has remained unchanged at one 
thousand rupees for a long time (cf. the texts of the Census Act, 1948 as amended over the years 
reproduced in GoI 2009: Annex 1). At present, this amount is comparable to what a manual labourer 
would earn in two (urban) or three (rural) days. However, it must have been more than three years 
of wages of a manual labourer when the Act was first adopted. So, the opportunity cost of violating 
the law must have been very high at the time of its enactment, which is not the case at present. 
Other laws governing statistics do not prescribe very high fines either. The Collection of Statistics 
Act, 2008, for instance, prescribes a fine of Rupees 1,000 (5,000) for individuals (companies), who 
refuse to answer or willfully give a false answer.11
The fines are not high in other common law countries either, such as the United States (not more 
than $500 as per U.S. Code Title 13, Section 221(a-b)), the United Kingdom (not exceeding Level 3 
on the standard scale, i.e., £1000, as per Census Act, 1920, Art 8[1]), Australia (One penalty unit as 
per Census and Statistics Act, 1905, Section 14[1], i.e., A$210) and Bangladesh (a prison sentence 
not exceeding one month and/or a fine not exceeding “two hundred rupees,” as per Census Order, 
1972, Art 13[e]). In Bangladesh, India, and the United States, and also in several other common law 
countries such as Botswana, Fiji, Malaysia, and the Bahamas, the fine is currently less than one per 
cent of per capita GDP (Figure 2). In Australia and the United Kingdom, the (maximum) fine is about 
three per cent of per capita GDP, while it is more than one per cent in Singapore. The fine is quite 
high in Pakistan (Pakistani Rupees 50,000 and “may extend to two hundred rupees for each day 
during which the offence continues” as per General Statistics [Reorganization] Act, 2011, Art 46) 
and is nearly 30 per cent of per capita GDP. Fines are also very high in South Africa. Pakistan and 
South Africa are outliers, possibly because their census laws are of recent origin. However, the fines 
are low in Australia where fines are revised regularly.
In any case, the punitive provisions of the census laws are rarely, if ever, used. The author is not 
aware of cases in India involving the prosecution of individuals on the grounds of refusing to 
respond to census questions or giving misleading responses. The government admits that even in 
11 The Collection of Statistics Act, 1953 (Art 8) did not distinguish between companies and individuals and prescribed a uniform 
fine of Rupees 500.
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the case of other related laws such as the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969, “prosecution 
for offences relating to violations of provisions of the Act are not strictly enforced as per rules” 
(GoN 2003: 4.3). Once again, the experience of other common law countries is in broad agreement 
with India’s experience. In the past seven censuses, the United Kingdom has never prosecuted more 
than a few hundred individuals for breaking the law (Glaister 2012). In Australia too, under the laws 
relating to the quinquennial census, not more than a few hundred people have been prosecuted 
over the past two decades (Purtill 2017). It seems that there has not been any prosecution related 
to the census in the United States since 1960 (Reamer 2012).12
In most countries, the census departments are wary of adopting a coercive and legalistic approach 
to dealing with non-cooperation on the part of people (see Prewitt 2003: 15 for the United States). 
Indeed, Australia’s experience suggests that even a mild emphasis on punitive measures such as 
fines could influence the public attitude towards the exercise and adversely affect the quality of 
the census data (Purtill 2017).
12 In Pakistan, the relevant law was tested for the first time in the 2017 Census. The details of its implementation are not yet 
well known.
Figure 2: Census fines relative to per capita GDP
Note: The graph shows the ratio of fines prescribed in census legislation to GDP per capita, both in current local currency units. 
In cases where there is a hierarchy of fines, both the primary (offence: refusing to supply information and, in some countries, 
supplying incorrect information) and secondary (offence: in some countries, supplying incorrect information) fines are shown.
Sources: Fines: Census/statistics laws downloaded from the webpages of the respective national statistical/legal departments 
or the United Nations Statistics Division (“Laws and Acts on vital statistics system,” https://unstats.un.org/unsd/vitalstatkb/
KnowledgebaseCategory14.aspx). GDP per capita (current Local Currency Unit, 2017): World Bank Open Data (https://data.
worldbank.org/).
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Census officials interviewed by the author argued that they cannot punish entire communities 
locked in competition over headcounts because that would permanently antagonise the people and 
it would be difficult to rebuild trust.13 They also argued that taking action against public servants 
for dereliction of duty would not help to resolve the problem because public servants cannot defy 
entire communities. If they are outsiders, they are personally vulnerable to pressure from local 
organisations and if they are from the same locality, their extended family is vulnerable as well. 
The census officials added that providing security cover to public servants engaged in the task of 
enumeration is not desirable because the government wants the census taking to be entirely non-
confrontational and non-coercive.14 It is not the case that the government does not envisage the 
provision of security cover for enumerators. The Collection of Statistics Rules, 2011, framed under 
the Collection of Statistics Act, 2008, stipulates that “In cases of collection of statistics in disturbed 
areas, the police, the para-military and the armed forces shall provide such assistance as would be 
required by the concerned statistics officer” (Art 10.3).15 However, the Collection of Statistics Act, 
2008 does not cover “human population census” (Art 32), and as a result cannot be used to provide 
security to census enumerators. Moreover, it is perhaps impractical to provide security to nearly 
three million enumerators who simultaneously conduct census across the country.
There is another reason why taking action against government officials is not feasible. Unlike 
most other government surveys that are conducted by relatively small groups of especially trained 
surveyors, the census requires a very large workforce. While the census is a federal activity, the 
union government depends on state governments to carry out the task of enumeration. State 
officials spare time for the activity in addition to their usual duties and are paid a very small 
honorarium. Punitive action can end up antagonising politically powerful employees’ unions and 
affect the collection of a whole range of government statistics, including electoral rolls, that cannot 
be prepared without the help of junior government officials in states, apart from creating political 
problems for the ruling party.
While it is understandable that the government cannot afford to prosecute errant and negligent 
government employees, it has even refrained from acting against manipulative individuals. A 
review of the cases reveals that in the past, the Census Act, 1948 has been invoked in the following 
types of cases: (a) objections to census-linked delimitation of constituencies for elections to various 
tiers of government;16 (b) objections to change of names or boundaries of administrative units while 
the census is in progress;17 (c) demand for regularisation of employees temporarily recruited to 
13 Commenting on non-response in the United States, Prewitt (2003: 15) notes: “People are busy. They don’t want to be bothered 
by such troublesome tasks as filling out a government form. Although the law says they have to, this is not a law that is enforced 
(for fear of backlash against the census that would further depress cooperation)” (emphasis added). Alonso Starr points out that 
modern censuses presume a “cooperative relation between a state and its citizens” (quoted in Prewitt 2010: 239, also see 
Bookman 2013: 51), even though they are backed by punitive laws.
14 The experience of countries such as Pakistan and Nigeria shows that the involvement of security forces in censuses creates 
more problems than it solves.
15 The Collection of Statistics Rules, 1959 did not provide for the security of the data collectors.
16 Chakhesang Public Organisation & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., W.P. No. 67 of 2006, Gauhati High Court.
17 Brij Kishore Verma vs. State of U.P., No. 10159 of 2010, Allahabad High Court.
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conduct the census;18 (d) objections to the delegation of authority to enumerate;19 (e) dispute over 
the status of headcounts in the intercensal period;20 and (f) demand for inclusion of more categories 
of information in the census questionnaire.21
Only some of the cases under Category (a) question the validity of census figures, with the rest 
questioning deviations from the guidelines for delimitation. Three aspects of these cases need 
to be noted. First, they question the census data in instrumental terms, i.e., manipulated census 
data are problematic insofar as they affect delimitation. Second, individuals or communities qua 
manipulators are not the defendants in these cases. Third, like all the other types of cases listed 
above, Category (a) cases have been filed by non-governmental individuals and organisations.
In short, the punitive provisions of the Census Act, 1948 are poorly designed and rarely invoked. A 
demonstration of the ineffectiveness of the punitive measures of the Act and their infrequent use 
does not, however, trivialise or undercut the importance of the law. It only shows that like many other 
laws around the world, there is a big gap between the law on the books and the law on the ground.22 
Handling erroneous data
We have so far seen that India’s census law is inadequate vis-à-vis manipulation by individuals, let 
alone collusive (politically motivated) manipulation, and its punitive provisions are ineffectual. 
Before we argue that the law does not have in-built provisions for quarantining and correcting 
erroneous data,23 an observation about the difficulty in identifying errors is in order. To secure 
conviction of an individual it has to be established that the information provided is incorrect 
conditional upon her/his ‘knowledge or belief.’ Similar clauses are found in other laws such as the 
Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 (Section 23 [1b]) and the Collection of Statistics Act, 
2008 (Section 6) and also in the census laws of several other common law countries.24 Incorrect 
responses to questions on, say, the number of members in a household can possibly be objectively 
 
18 State of Orissa and Others Prasana Kumar Sahoo, Appeal (Civil) 2167 of 2007, Supreme Court of India.
19 Hill View Colony and Ors. vs. Industrial Village Razuphe and Ors., Writ Appeal No. 23 (K) of 2010, Gauhati High Court 
(Kohima Bench).
20 The Communist Party of India and Ors. etc. vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr., Writ Petition. Nos. 2162 and 2210 of 1985, High 
Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench).
21 T. D. Dathan vs.The Union of India, Original Petition 1997 of 1991, High Court of Kerala.
22 Ellickson (1986) shows that despite widespread violations of the formal laws governing cattle trespass, individuals and 
government officials in Shasta County, California, rarely invoked those laws. They instead relied on informal norms, and the 
formal laws served as outside options that were invoked only rarely when local mechanisms of dispute resolution failed.
23 The Registrar General of India and Census Commissioner can withhold the publication of data for various reasons under 
the Census Rules, 1990 (Section 7). As mentioned earlier, the language tables for PEPSU and Himachal Pradesh were not 
published after the 1951 Census due to concerns about the quality of data (Gill 2007: 244). Results for three sub divisions of 
the state of Manipur and (only) the General Population Tables for the state of Nagaland were not published after the 2001 
Census for similar reasons. In each of these cases, the decision was administrative and ad hoc in nature and did not invoke 
the Census Act or even the Census Rules.
24 U.S. Code Title 13, Section 221[a] expects everyone to respond “to the best of his knowledge”, whereas in Britain (Census Act, 
1920) and Australia (Census and Statistics Act, 1905) the census does not impose such a requirement. The Pakistani Census 
expects respondents to give answers to “the best of his knowledge and belief” (Art 23[3]) and “the best of his knowledge or 
belief” (Art 24[2]) (General Statistics [Reorganization] Act, 2011, emphasis added). Note in passing the use of the masculine 
pronoun ‘his’ to refer to respondents in different countries.
11Working Paper Series - Manipulation of Census Data and the Limits of Punitive Legislation
identified. However, prosecution will be difficult in case of incorrect response to questions related 
to identity, which happen to be the most contentious questions.25
The census manual is silent on the course of action during or after enumeration if verification 
confirms the suspicion of collusive manipulation. The Act prescribes punishment in case of 
violation of the obligations under the law but does not require compliance. In other words, a person 
punished for supplying incorrect information to the enumerator is not expected to provide the 
correct information. Even if the person provides the correct information in the process of legal 
proceedings, there is no provision for updating the census data. Under the Collection of Statistics 
Act, 2008 (Art 15[2]) and the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 (Art 13[4]) punishment does 
not release respondents from the obligation to provide correct information. In the United Kingdom, 
a person guilty of violating the Census Act, 1920 can possibly seek exemption from prosecution by 
offering to comply after the filing of case (Glaister 2012).
These lacunae are complemented by the absence of any provision for the correction or withdrawal 
of erroneous census data. More precisely, there is no provision for the correction of census estimates 
after the completion of the post-enumeration survey (known as post-enumeration checks in earlier 
censuses). Post-enumeration survey is carried out by the same machinery that conducted the census 
and is, therefore, susceptible to moral hazard. In any case, even after post-enumeration surveys are 
completed the unadjusted census estimates continue to hold as the official estimates. This partly 
explains why various government agencies, researchers and media continue to use flawed statistics 
more than a decade after the Nagaland government rejected the results.26
Nagaland’s demographic somersault
Nagaland is a small state located in the northeastern part of India. According to the 2011 Census 
of India, Nagaland’s population declined in absolute terms between 2001 and 2011. This happens 
to be the only instance of absolute decline in a state’s population in independent India.27 Nagaland 
registered decadal population growth rates of 56 per cent during 1981–1991 and 65 per cent during 
1991–2001, compared to the corresponding national averages of 24 and 22 per cent, respectively. 
During this period, Nagaland’s growth rate was among the highest in the world. Its population 
contracted by about 0.6 per cent between 2001 and 2011 and its growth rate was among the lowest 
in the world. The contraction happened in the absence of war, epidemical disease, famine, natural 
calamity, or significant socio-economic change.
25 Göderle (2016: 81) points out that nineteenth century Europe realised that “the threat of punishment” was “pointless” as 
“The administration lacked the means to identify false declarations” (emphasis added).
26 For a discussion of the use of flawed data from the 2001 Census in the national sample surveys, see Agrawal and Kumar 
(2014, 2017).
27 Exceptions can be found if we include the period 1941–1951, which overlaps with the colonial period, as well as the union 
territories. Two union territories, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (1941–51) and Daman and Diu (1951–1961), and two states, 
Punjab (1941–51) and West Bengal (1941–51), had reported negative growth rates in the decade of decolonisation (GoI 2011a).
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Conventional demographic factors cannot explain Nagaland’s demographic somersault — decades 
of very high population growth (1971–2001) followed by a sudden contraction (2001–11) (Figure 
3). A combination of political and economic factors — competition over development funding, 
government jobs, and political representation in the legislative assembly, and demands for the 
creation of new administrative units — triggered widespread competitive manipulation of the census 
by communities. The over-count was partly corrected in 2011, which explains the contraction of 
the population (Agrawal and Kumar 2012, 2013, 2018; Kumar and Agrawal 2016).
The problem of the manipulation of enumeration in Nagaland did not receive any attention from 
the administration nor academia across three censuses (1981–2001), even though the state’s 
headcount was distorted by very large, systematic and growing errors.28 The Census Act, 1948 could 
not prevent mass manipulation in Nagaland despite the 1994 amendment that added teeth to the 
punitive provisions. Discussions with several politicians, including former chief ministers and 
cabinet ministers, and senior bureaucrats, who were in charge of law and order and the census, 
revealed that none of them had considered applying the punitive measures of the Census Act, 1948 
at any stage during the 2001 Census.
The government was, however, compelled to act after 2001 because the severity of manipulation 
threatened to destabilise the fragile inter-tribal electoral equilibrium. Some tribes were more 
successful in manipulating their headcounts ahead of the 2002 delimitation of legislative assembly 
constituencies. On 18 August 2005, the Nagaland Legislative Assembly passed a resolution demanding 
a fresh census. On 22 August 2005, the Chief Secretary of Nagaland informed the Registrar General 
of India and the Census Commissioner of “the decision of [the] Govt of Nagaland rejecting [the] 
2001 Census Report” (Chakhesang Public Organisation & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., W.P. No. 67 
of 2006). By then the Registrar General had already published the Provisional Population Totals 
for Nagaland. After the results were challenged in courts, the Registrar General withheld the 
publication of the General Population Tables for Nagaland.
In 2008, a presidential ordinance postponed delimitation in four north-eastern states, including 
Nagaland, and Jharkhand. At a consultative meeting held on 30 September 2009, the state 
government canvassed the support of all political parties, a wide range of civil society organisations, 
church organisations, student organisations, tribal bodies, and village elders to make a fresh start. 
The participants unanimously agreed that the “previous censuses conducted in Nagaland were 
defective and inaccurate” and that the next census “should be conducted properly” (GoN 2009, 
emphasis added). This consensus helped the Directorate of Census Operations, Nagaland, to conduct 
enumeration with less interference than in the past. The government also assured the villages 
that the existing fund allocation would not be affected by the next census, while at the same time 
warning them that in future it would not use manipulated headcounts to hike the funding (Agrawal 
and Kumar 2018). In other words, the problem was addressed without recourse to law.
28 Similar problems have affected the collection of government statistics, even if to a lesser extent, in other states such as 
Assam, Jammu and Kashmir (Guilmoto and Rajan 2013), Maharashtra (Kulkarni 1991), Manipur (Laithangbam 2004), Punjab 
(Gill 2007), and Uttar Pradesh (Verma 2013)  and other multi-ethnic countries such as Nigeria (Adepoju 1981).
13Working Paper Series - Manipulation of Census Data and the Limits of Punitive Legislation
Census Games
Collusive manipulation involves an element of strategic competition. In the literature on ethnic 
conflict and demography, communities and administrative units are treated as the units of analysis, 
i.e., as the strategic actors (Horowitz 2000; Janus 2013).29 When the state of Nagaland was formed each 
community was assigned a certain number of seats in the legislative assembly. Likewise, the borders 
of administrative units of Nagaland were “drawn so as to leave, as far as possible, each tribal group 
under a single district [or sub-district] administrative authority” (GoI 1966: 31). So, the geographical 
distribution of communities within Nagaland is largely coterminous with administrative divisions 
and electoral constituencies. We can, therefore, restrict our focus to communities.
Communities are the units of analysis as the share of seats in the legislature and the allocation of 
development funds are at stake. Both of these accrue to the community as a whole rather than to 
29 For a discussion of interactions between communities and between communities and the government in Nagaland, see 
Agrawal and Kumar (2018) and Wouters (2018).
Figure 3: Decadal Population Growth Rates, 1951–2011
Notes: (i) * The growth rates for Nagaland and India for the period 1951–61 have been computed after excluding Tuensang, 
where only a small fraction of the population was enumerated in the 1951 Census. (ii) † The growth rates have been further 
adjusted for the periods 1961–71 and 1971–81 to take into account the change in the reference date in 1971. (iii) ‡ The growth 
rate of Nagaland was the highest among all the states of India. (iv) World (Extremum) is shown only for 1981–2011, i.e., the period 
during which Nagaland’s population grew at abnormal rates compared to the rest of the country. Until 2001 the growth rate 
of Nagaland was positive so ‘World (Extremum)’ shown in the figure corresponds to the maximum growth rate in the periods 
1980–90 and 1990–2000 recorded by any territory listed in the World Population Prospects 2010. During 2001–11 the growth rate of 
Nagaland was negative and ‘World (Extremum)’ in the period 2000–10 corresponds to the minimum growth rate.
Sources: Agrawal and Kumar (2018: 61)
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any individual.30 Government officials are not included as a player as they do not have the means to 
enforce their will against whole communities determined to flout the law, and even if they detect 
manipulation, follow-up action is not guaranteed in the current cycle of enumeration.31
Further, it is assumed that communities move simultaneously, i.e., they are not aware of the 
choices made by others during enumeration before they make their own choices. This assumption 
is justified because India’s decennial census follows the extended de facto (synchronous) method of 
enumeration, i.e., it is carried out simultaneously across jurisdictions. Therefore, each community 
has to choose without knowing if and by how much other communities have over-reported their 
own numbers. Moreover, no community controls all the nodes of the bureaucracy so as to be able 
to access real-time data pertaining to other communities when enumeration is underway. Indeed, 
even senior bureaucrats get to know the aggregate figures at least a week after enumeration. It is 
also assumed that players have complete information as communities have known each other for 
a long time. Last but not the least, it is assumed that this is a one-shot game because the census is 
conducted once in a decade and not every census is directly linked to the distribution of the public 
pie.32 In short, we can use normal-form games to understand the strategic interdependence of 
communities manipulating their headcounts. For the sake of convenience, the games are restricted 
to two communities. However, the results can be generalised to n-communities.
Manipulation games
A community is worse off if it does not over-report its population while others do so. There are 
two reasons for this. First, it loses electoral seats and share in public expenditure on development, 
both of which are distributed on the basis of population.33 Second, the chances of a fresh census 
being held are slim when other communities have over-reported their headcounts because they 
would prefer the new status quo that favours them. Nevertheless, the over-reporting of population 
is costly because officials have to be bribed or coerced to manipulate records. Moreover, there is a 
threat of conflict with communities that are denied a fair share of electoral seats and government 
funds due to manipulation, and also the risk of detection and punishment by state authorities. This 
is reflected in several objections to census-linked delimitation of electoral constituencies filed in 
courts. When all communities over-report their headcounts, each incurs the cost of manipulation 
to maintain its population share, and they still risk detection by state authorities and conflict with 
rival communities. In addition, development planning is vitiated until the problem is addressed.
30 The bulk of development funds are allocated for the building and maintenance of public infrastructure. The substance of this 
discussion remains unchanged as long as funds are distributed equitably within the community. Intra-community equity is 
sought to be achieved in a roundabout fashion in Nagaland, where a dense network of civil society organisations involves 
a large number of people other than bureaucrats and politicians. The latter are expected to contribute generously to civil 
society organisations. A detailed examination of this distributive mechanism requires a separate discussion.
31 To include government officials as a player, we will have to introduce the time dimension as well as two types of officials—
junior officials/field supervisors and enumerators as well as senior officials/decision-makers. This will complicate the game 
and divert attention from the primary objective, namely, highlighting how strategic interactions result in widespread 
competitive manipulation of the census.
32 The 1971 Census remains the most important determinant of federal redistribution in India.
33 For a model that explicitly accounts for contest between communities over legislative seats and development spending, see 
Kumar and Agrawal (2016).
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The interaction between communities during the census operation can be represented using a 
simultaneous move game of complete information in which each community has two pure strategies 
– Over-report and Not Over-report. The following conditions govern the ordering of outcomes.
(a) A community is better off over-reporting its population if others are also over-reporting their 
populations, i.e., (Over-report, Over-report) is preferred to (Not Over-report, Over-report).
(b) The outcome represented by (Over-report, Over-report) is not better than (Not Over-report, Not 
Over-report) because under the former, the status quo is maintained as the state is compelled 
to use old statistics and the effort invested in manipulating statistics goes waste.
(c) (a) and (b) imply that the over-reporting of their respective populations by both communities 
(Over-report, Over-report) can neither be the best outcome, nor the worst outcome for either 
community.
(d) (Not Over-report, Not Over-report) cannot be the worst outcome because under the status quo, 
communities do not incur any costs of manipulation. Otherwise, communities would perversely 
prefer simultaneous manipulation even though this entails costs without concomitant gain.
(e) Over-reporting when other communities are not over-reporting (Over-report, Not Over-report) 
is preferred to (Over-report, Over-report).
(f) The relative ordering of (Not Over-report, Not Over-report) and (Over-report, Not Over-report) 
is not clear a priori.
Given the above conditions, only two different orderings of the four outcomes are possible. Each of 
the following orderings relates to a different type of player.
Type I: (Not Over-report, Not Over-report) ≻ (Over-report, Not Over-report) ≻ (Over-report, Over-
report) ≻ (Not Over-report, Over-report)
Type II: (Over-report, Not Over-report) ≻ (Not Over-report, Not Over-report) ≻ (Over-report, Over-
report) ≻ (Not Over-report, Over-report)
These two orderings can support three 2x2 games depending on how the communities rank the 
outcomes (Figure 4). In the first two games, the players are paired with their own types (I–I and 
II–II), whereas in the last game, different types of players are paired (I–II or II–I). The games are 
analysed below.
Game 1 (Type I–Type I, Game of Coordination): This game has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Under 
the first equilibrium, neither community over-reports (Not Over-report, Not Over-report), whereas 
under the second, both communities over-report (Over-report, Over-report). The former Pareto-
dominates the latter. This game has a mixed-strategy equilibrium as well. The mixed-strategy 
equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by (Not Over-report, Not Over-report). The mixed-strategy 
equilibrium can be interpreted in two ways: (a) a community randomises over different actions 
across time and space; or (b) each community is comprised of two different types of people who 
differ with respect to their propensity to manipulate.
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Game 2 (Type II–Type II, Prisoner’s Dilemma): This game has just one pure-strategy equilibrium in 
which both communities over-report (Over-report, Over-report), which is Pareto-dominated by 
(Not Over-report, Not Over-report).
Game 3 (Type I–Type II/Type II–Type I): The equilibria of this game resemble those of Game 2.
The widespread manipulation of the 2001 Census of Nagaland, when almost all communities 
over-reported their numbers, relates to the (Over-report, Over-report) equilibrium of Game 1. 
The outcome of the 2011 Census of Nagaland relates to the (Not Over-report, Not Over-report) 
equilibrium of Game 1 because almost all communities refrained from engaging in manipulation. 
Figure 5 shows that population growth rates were very high across Nagaland in 2001. Likewise the 
growth rates were low across the state in the 2011 Census. As discussed in the previous section, this 
equilibrium switching happened due to the state government’s awareness campaign.
Figure 4: Manipulation Games
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The mixed-strategy equilibrium of Game 1 relates to (a) the 2001 Census of Manipur, where only 
some communities in the northern hill districts over-reported their populations; (b) the 1991 
Census of Nagaland, where only some communities over-reported their populations; and (c) the 
2011 Census of Jammu and Kashmir, where over-reporting of population was mostly confined to 
the Kashmir Valley.
Correction Games
Within a few years after 2001, both the state government as well as the people of Nagaland had 
a fairly good idea of the scale and geographical and communitarian distribution of manipulation 
in 2001. Faced with the state’s exhortation to correct the population figures, the communities of 
Nagaland were caught in a difficult situation because they would have lost certain benefits if they 
were the only ones doing the correcting. As noted above, the state government tried to help build 
trust by facilitating a public dialogue involving all stakeholders.
The previous section dealt with the 2001 and 2011 Censuses of Nagaland as if in both the cases 
the communities were faced with the choice of manipulation – in the former census, they chose 
to manipulate and in the latter, they chose not to manipulate. However, the choice facing the 
people of Nagaland in 2011 was different, even though it can be argued that this is equivalent to the 
decision about whether to (reject calls for correction and) continue to over-report. In 2011, they 
had to decide whether to allow correction of the previously manipulated headcount. Given the 
changed context, the strategic interactions in 2011 should be modelled using a different game. The 
following conditions govern the ordering of outcomes when communities face pressure to correct 
previously manipulated headcounts.
(a) Both communities not reporting correct headcounts (Not correct, Not correct) cannot be 
the best outcome as it benefits neither community and only defers adjustment, whereas 
development planning is affected in the meantime.
(b) For either community, both communities correcting simultaneously (Correct, Correct) cannot 
be worse than both not correcting (Not correct, Not correct).
(c) Only one of the communities correcting (Not correct, Correct) cannot be the best outcome for 
either community as development planning continues to be hamstrung and conflict between 
those who have corrected and those who have not intensifies.
(d) For a community, both communities not correcting (Not correct, Not correct) cannot be worse 
than when it is the only one correcting (Correct, Not correct).
(e) A community is worse off when it corrects its population while the other community does not 
(Correct, Not correct) compared to when it does not correct its population while the other 
community corrects its population (Not correct, Correct).
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Given these conditions, the following orderings of outcomes are possible.
I: (Correct, Correct) ≻ (Not correct, Not correct) ≻ (Not correct, Correct) ≻ (Correct, Not correct)
II: (Correct, Correct) ≻ (Not correct, Correct) ≻ (Not correct, Not correct) ≻ (Correct, Not correct)
These orderings support three games of which two games pair identical types, whereas the 
third pairs different types (Figure 6). In all games, (Correct, Correct) is one of the pure-strategy 
equilibria, with (Not Correct, Not Correct) being the other pure-strategy equilibrium; the latter is 
Pareto-dominated by the former. All three games support a mixed-strategy equilibrium. In the first 
game, the mixed-strategy equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by both the pure-strategy equilibria. In 
the second game, the mixed-strategy equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by (Correct, Correct) and it 
Figure 5: Distribution of Population Growth Rates across 
Sub-district Administrative Units of Nagaland
Note: The number of circles in the state increased from 69 in 1981 to 114 in 2011 with inter-circle territorial transfers in some 
cases. The above figure reports growth rates for 78 circles for which comparable data can be generated for the period 1981-2011.
Sources: Various census reports
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Pareto-dominates (Not Correct, Not Correct). In the third game, it is Pareto-dominated by (Correct, 
Correct) and neither dominates nor is dominated by (Not Correct, Not Correct).
Discussion
The case of the 2011 Census of Nagaland corresponds to the games of pure coordination whether 
we examine it using manipulation games or correction games. Manipulation games suggest 
that the communities in Nagaland were locked in a game of pure coordination and did not over-
report their respective populations in 2011. Likewise, correction games suggest that in 2011 the 
communities were locked in a game of pure coordination and chose to correct inflated headcounts. 
It is noteworthy that in the case of correction, all games have multiple equilibria, which is not true 
in the case of manipulation. This suggests that correction could not have been achieved without 
putting in place confidence-building measures because manipulating alone is perhaps less risky 
than correcting alone.
Type 2 and Type 3 manipulation games (Figure 4) are unlikely to be relevant in the case of Nagaland 
because in these games the players can move to the Pareto-dominant outcome only under the 
threat of punishment. In discussions with census officials and political leaders, the author did not 
come across any hint that the use of punitive measures against individuals or communities was 
contemplated. The government invoked the threat of punishment only mechanically in general 
Figure 6: Correction Games
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warnings. It also announced that enumeration would be cross-checked using church membership 
records (GoN 2009) and would be followed by the collection of biometric data (Assam Tribune 2011), 
but neither measure was made part of the officially declared schedule of the 2011 Census.
The switching did not happen due to any change in the punitive provisions of the Census Act, 1948 (the 
last amendment was introduced in 1994), threat of punishment, political change or socio-economic 
change. A public interaction two years before the enumeration (GoN 2009) and a general advertisement 
campaign in the run-up to the 2011 Census (GoI 2011c: 6–7) played a key role. The message of the 
advertisements released by the Census authorities (e.g., “My future must be built on the truth–Correct 
Census means strong future!”) was buttressed by the statements of political (Rio 2011: 73–74) and civil 
society (Rutsa 2011) leaders, who appealed to the Christian-moral values of Naga society.
(Photo by Vikas Kumar, Kohima, 24 September 2012)
The government took steps to improve vigilance of the census operations, assured greater 
transparency in census operations, and facilitated confidence-building measures among 
communities. It brought all political and non-political stakeholders together in a consultative 
meeting and tried to build a (legally non-binding) consensus in favour of a clean census. This 
helped communities to publicly debate the issue and to arrive at a better understanding of the 
problem as well as the importance of an accurate census. At the meeting, they resolved to support 
the government’s initiative to conduct a clean census and also agreed that community volunteers 
would accompany census enumerators in the field and that enumerators would not be appointed 
to their “home” areas. During the 2011 Census, whenever enumerators faced resistance from a 
community, they approached the relevant signatories to the 2009 resolution for help.
A clarification about the nature of the aforesaid interaction between communities is in order. The 
interaction happened (long) before enumeration was carried out, and therefore does not amount to 
communication during the play of the game. This left the door wide open for a strategic departure 
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from the general non-binding consensus arrived at earlier through public debate. Moreover, the 
extended de facto (synchronous) method of enumeration meant that, as before at the time of 
enumeration, communities were in the dark about the manipulation of headcounts, if any, being 
carried out by others. Also note that the interaction was in the form of general discussions on 
public platforms that included all stakeholders. The participants addressed their concerns to the 
government without attacking their fellow representatives from other communities. The interaction 
helped the leaders arrive at a better understanding of the problems both from the perspective of 
the communities as well as the state government. The interaction served as a confidence-building 
measure and helped the society as a whole to resolve to clean up the mess. However, it needs to be 
stressed that at no point did the government try to facilitate dialogues between the communities 
locked in direct conflicts over headcounts. All that the government did was to shift attention to 
another equilibrium in a game of multiple equilibria, i.e., it highlighted another focal point (cf. 
discussion on the role of law in Basu 2015).
The importance of the transparent consultative process that produced a legally non-binding 
commitment becomes evident when we compare Nagaland with Manipur and Jammu and Kashmir, 
which also faced similar problems with respect to the census and in both states the 2002 delimitation 
could not be implemented. The Naga-dominated hill districts of Manipur that share a border with 
Nagaland reported very high population growth rates in the 2001 Census. Political parties opposed 
to the delimitation of constituencies on the basis of the flawed census approached the union 
government (NENA 2007) and the Gauhati High Court (Manipur Pradesh Congress Committee and 
Ors. vs Union of India and Ors. 2007). Manipur failed to resolve the problem in the 2011 Census. 
Unlike Nagaland, Manipur held only one community responsible for the problem and tried to 
correct the problem through coercive administrative mechanisms. Jammu and Kashmir, where 
the problems in the 2001 Census remained unacknowledged, faced a bigger problem in 2011, with 
widespread over-reporting in the Kashmir Valley.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have discussed the census law of India and other common law countries. Our 
discussion has revealed several structural flaws in India’s Census Act, 1948 that were overlooked 
by both the National Statistical Commission (GoI nd1) as well as the Committee on Legislative 
Measures in Statistical Matters (GoI 2011b). The Act prescribes a light punishment in case of 
violation of the legal obligations by respondents, but does not demand subsequent compliance. 
Fines are not linked to the degree of manipulation nor to the opportunity cost. More importantly, 
the punitive provisions of the Census Act, 1948 are rarely, if ever, used. Comparison with other 
common law countries suggests that the Indian experience or stance with regard to the magnitude 
of the prescribed punishment and the non-invocation of punitive provisions is not unique. In most 
countries, fines related to violation of census laws by respondents are not only low and stagnant, 
but also rarely implemented. Furthermore, in India, collusive manipulation of the census by several 
individuals, or by individuals and officials, is not treated as a problem that is structurally different 
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from individual manipulation. In other words, the Act overlooks the strategic interactions driving 
manipulation. The possibility of manipulation leading to content errors is acknowledged in the 
instruction manual for enumerators, but the related coverage errors are not covered. Manipulation 
of the census by the government as a source of error is completely ignored. There is no provision 
for the correction or withdrawal of erroneous figures.
The neglect of strategic interactions during enumeration is, in fact, part of a larger problem. While 
the design of the census tries to minimise the possibilities of manipulation (and of double counting) 
by simultaneously enumerating the population, it overlooks the fact that this feature also engenders 
insecurity in a divided society leading to competitive manipulation. If the economy is dominated by 
the state, communities try to secure their future claims on the public pie by boosting their numbers 
in the census and other official records.34 In his global survey of ethnic conflicts that draws attention 
to the interlinkages between ethnic conflict, election, and competitive manipulation of the census, 
Horowitz (2000: 194–196) argues: “In a severely divided society, we have seen that an election can 
become an ethnic head count. Now it is clear that a census needs to be “won.” So the election is a 
census, and the census is an election.”35 The rule of thumb is that where society is divided primarily 
along ethnic lines and where weak public institutions are unable to mediate between ethnic groups, 
demographic statistics are likely to be manipulated.36 The availability and reliability of statistics 
will be unsatisfactory in such ethnically divided societies, which face collective action problems, 
insofar as census statistics can be seen as public goods.37
The only way out of such situations is to build trust in the impartiality of government institutions 
and facilitate dialogue between communities. Our discussion has highlighted how disregarding 
strategic interactions could open the door for the competitive manipulation of the census, 
in particular, and of government processes, in general. We have used normal-form games to 
understand a community’s decision to manipulate government statistics in multi-ethnic societies 
to protect or advance its interests. Stricter laws and harsher penalties will not address the root 
cause of the problem and will also remain inoperable or ineffective in the face of mass violation. The 
games used in this paper to explain competitive manipulation have multiple equilibria. Societies 
can move from one equilibrium to another without the threat of legal sanction. So, imposing 
34 This insight can be confirmed with the help of a fuller model in which communities manipulate headcounts to increase their 
share of seats in the legislature and to receive a larger proportion of development spending allocated by the government 
and are mindful of the costs of manipulation (including fines) (Kumar and Agrawal 2016). Also note that the simple models 
presented in this paper can subsume the case of unequal over-reporting by communities.
35 Others have equated the census in such settings with “plebiscite” and “political campaign” (Kertzer and Arel 2002: 28–29), 
“opinion polls” (Abramson 2002: 178), “show of strength” (Hekali Zhimomi, Director Census Operations, Nagaland, personal 
communication, Kohima, 25 June 2013), “weapons” (Karmakar 2010), “negotiation” (Aung 2018), “political weapons” 
(Adepoju 1981: 29), and “Census War” (Khan Bahadur Sheikh Fazl-i-Ilahi, Superintendent of Census Operations, Delhi, quoted 
in Ahmed 1999: 124).
36 Even otherwise the census and politics are inseparable insofar as the decisions about whom to count and how to count are 
inherently political choices. The deep and multifaceted relationship between demographic statistics and politics is, in fact, 
a defining feature of modern societies.
37 Heine and Oltmanns (2016: 207) argue that “data from the statistical infrastructure can be ascribed the characteristics of 
public goods, because statistical data can be consumed on a non-competing basis… The marginal costs of production are zero 
and therefore the price-mechanism does not work.”
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existing penalties or imposing newer penalties is not the solution.38 Confidence-building measures, 
engagement with communities, and transparency in operations39 are key to addressing the trust 
deficit that drives competitive manipulation of census statistics. Our discussion has relevance 
for other situations involving the mass violation of laws, where the concerned actors view the 
setting in zero-sum terms and where simultaneity of moves can be assumed.40 For instance, most 
incidents of communal violence involve, or are triggered by, mutual misunderstanding between 
communities due to the absence of credible channels of communication and the lack of trust in the 
administration’s ability or willingness to punish the other community should it choose to take the 
law into its hands. Communities resort to self-help under such circumstances.
38 Kulkarni (1991) analysed the problem of the over-estimation of the headcount of the Halba/Halbi tribe in Maharashtra, 
where non-tribal people reported themselves as belonging to that tribe. He attributed the over-count on, among other 
things, the non-advertisement of the punitive provisions of the Census Act, 1948 (ibid.: 207). It is not clear how this would 
have deterred false reporting in absence of a credible expression of the government’s resolve to prosecute people engaging 
in manipulation en masse.
39 Commenting on the quality of the Socio Economic and Caste Census (SECC), Saxena (2015: 15) points out that the government 
did not accept “the most important recommendation [of the N. C. Saxena Committee] of conducting the census and collecting 
information openly in gram sabha meetings that are filmed to promote transparency and avoid backdoor influences was not 
accepted. Instead, the ministry decided to send a surveyor to each person’s house . . .” This solution cannot be applied to the 
decennial census. Unlike the SECC, which is governed by executive decisions, the census is circumscribed by the Constitution 
and by the Census Act, 1948, which provides for high levels of confidentiality.
40 Our discussion does not apply to every government policy that has redistributive consequences. It only applies in those cases 
where people have to make choices without knowing how others are making their respective choices. This condition is not 
easy to satisfy. It is satisfied in the case of the census because of the specific structure of the exercise, that is, extended de 
facto (synchronous) method of enumeration.
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